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step, since Sweden, alongside Russia, was their "enemy", and therefore it was reasonable to assume that it would favour the Russian interest. At its turn, the Swedish diplomacy insisted that none of the treaties made with Russia referred to the Porte. The dethronement of Selim III and the rise to power of sultan Mustapha IV, with well-known anti-French ideas, contributed to the impairment of the French-Ottoman rapports, making Napoleon I to accept beginning the conversation with Russia about the possibility to
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respected the Tilsit stipulations and declared war on Sweden. Aș it is known, Sweden lost the war against Russia. Alongside the army's ill-endowment, the treason of the commandant officer of the Sveaborg fortress, it should be reminded that the Porte didn't follow the Swedish requests about the coordination of the SwedishOttoman military actions against Russia. Furthermore, the increasing tension în the Ottoman Empire following the overthrow of Selim III, which moreover led to the fall of Mustapha IV, replaced
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Selim III, which moreover led to the fall of Mustapha IV, replaced with Mahmud ÎI through a coup d'Etat on the 28th of July 1808, together with the belligerence with England represented the motifs for the diminishment of the Porte's capability to fight vigorously the war against Russia. This fact let Russia focus its efforts on the Finish front against Sweden. The war against Russia ended în the known manner. The peace made at Fredrikshamm on the 17th of
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the Coalition of the European states against the Napoleonic France, Sweden managed to take Norway, action recognized through the documents of Vienna (1815). IV. The Northern states în the Ottoman Empire's European policy (1792-1814) The last war between the Porte and Russia convinced sultan Selim III that only through a strictly neutral policy from the military conflicts that continued to rummage Europe could be ensured the necessary conditions for the political and instituțional reorganisation of the Empire. Through this, he
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permanent diplomatic legations în the most important European capitals. The first one was set at London, în 1793. Afterwards, the ones at Vienna, în 1794, Berlin, în 1795, and Paris, în 1796 were established. Still, the foreign policy of the Porte continued to be the prerogative of the sultan, of the Reis effendi and of the great dragoman, through direct parley with the credited diplomatic representatives of the European great powers, and not only, at Istanbul. Among the Empire's foreign
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the Empire's foreign policy priorities, în the form they were postulated în January 1793 by Mehmed Rashid effendi, Reis effendi, were the desired relations with Sweden, Russia, Great Britain, France, Spain and Poland. Regarding the Swedish role în the Porte's European policy, it was more then a virtual ally, for the support of the Turkish efforts to stop the Russian expansion în Europe, but also it hâd the role of a wise advisor for the accomplishment of the program
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d'Ohsson, which took it, tacitly, for his country, thus justifying all the suspicions of Russia and Austria, totally indisposed by any attempt to consolidate the unstable Ottoman Empire. În these conditions, at the beginning of the year 1794 the Porte announced its intention to inițiate a European system of alliance, for the purpose of rescue and consolidation of the Ottoman position în the European Orient, threatened în the first place by the aggressive Russian policy în the area. On the
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of them, France, hâd the most important place în this future alliance system, în which the Ottoman Empire puț its trust, because it was, în the Turkish vision, its natural ally. The second power that received the hopes of the Porte was Great Britain. The rapprochement of this great European power was determined by the political situation evolution, with the internal disturbances în France, its exhaustion, which raised questions about its future, the Russian and Prussian aggression on Poland, concluded with
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France, its exhaustion, which raised questions about its future, the Russian and Prussian aggression on Poland, concluded with its division, aș well aș the expansionist policy of Russia. A special place was taken by Prussia în the projects of the Porte. Although this power made for them real services, by mediating, alongside England, the peace concluded at Sistow, on the 4th of July 1791, the Ottoman leaders could not ignore the connexions with Russia and Austria, aș well aș its contribution
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at Sistow, on the 4th of July 1791, the Ottoman leaders could not ignore the connexions with Russia and Austria, aș well aș its contribution to the second dismemberment of Poland and to the first anti-French coalition. Nevertheless, the High Porte dissimulated with attention its feelings, aș the priority în the European policy was to accomplish this project, by detaching Prussia of Austria and Russia, instead of attaching it to the Ottoman interests. Finally, the fourth power that the Ottoman Empire
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to accomplish this project, by detaching Prussia of Austria and Russia, instead of attaching it to the Ottoman interests. Finally, the fourth power that the Ottoman Empire could imagine în this virtual European system of alliance was Sweden. Still, the Porte did not trust completely în the will and the deșire of Sweden to support its European policy. Of course, this suspicion was maintained by the intrigues of its enemies, especially of Russia. În return, this state was the only one
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and the deșire of Sweden to support its European policy. Of course, this suspicion was maintained by the intrigues of its enemies, especially of Russia. În return, this state was the only one among the neighbouring powers that worried the Porte. Therefore, the attitude towards Russia was one of the major directions în the European policy of the Porte. This is the reason why a continuous interest for the changes în the relations between this country and the other powers, mainly
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intrigues of its enemies, especially of Russia. În return, this state was the only one among the neighbouring powers that worried the Porte. Therefore, the attitude towards Russia was one of the major directions în the European policy of the Porte. This is the reason why a continuous interest for the changes în the relations between this country and the other powers, mainly Great Britain, Prussia and Sweden existed în Istanbul. The purpose was, obviously, to exploit any moment that could
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created problems în others areas of Europe, especially în the north, and for solving them Russia would have to disperse the forces concentrated on the borders of the Ottoman Empire, action that would have diminished the pressure on them. The Porte did not limit to the surveillance of these rapports, but also attempted to control them, making use of its own projects, among them the intention to take an important role în the reestablishment of the equilibrium of power on the
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în the attempt to spare the interests and suspicions of the European powers, of which support or opposition depended the accomplishment of this objective. This is why, while not sparing any effort to draw Sweden în its European politics, the Porte was striving to convince Prussia that there was nothing about the supposed favours made for the French or Swedish interests that would damage the Prussian ones. Still, the apparition of the Triple Alliance (England, Austria and Russia), în February-May 1795
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much desired or, at least, strictly defensive. But the Ottomans hâd another vision on this alliance, assuming that not they, but France and Sweden were supposed to take the main role în its constitution. The special attention given by the Porte to the collaboration with Sweden, both în the bilateral rapports, and în its projects about the creation of an extended European coalition, was a consequence, aș acknowledged by Ignatius Mouradgea d'Ohsson, of the role that this state could take
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state could take, together with France, acting for the attenuation of the negative effects on the Ottoman Empire's security of the disintegration of Poland. But the Polish problem was a very sensitive issue, which could very well foil the Porte's efforts to determine Prussia to take on this idea of building a coalition. Therefore, the Ottoman rulers were aware that they hâd yet to spare, at least apparently, the Prussian interests în Poland. This is why they tried to
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Ottoman rulers were aware that they hâd yet to spare, at least apparently, the Prussian interests în Poland. This is why they tried to ensure it that the proposed alliance will not affect them. Under pressure from the circumstances, the Porte hâd to accept, for that moment, to make a defensive alliance with France, signed on the 23rd of March 1796. But this remained a simple "diplomatic exercise", because the French government did not confirm it, neither did the sultan. The
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of the Eastern Question, on the whole, and particularly în the history of the juridical regime of the Straits. Aș Napoleon Bonaparte continued the military operations în Egypt, aș well aș the incitements of Great Britain and Russia determined the Porte to declare war to France, on the 2nd of September 1798. After this, the diplomatic negotiations with Russia for alliance against France was accelerated. Aș the Ottomans feared that the future collaboration with Russia could have negative consequences on the
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continental wars triggered by this on the political conjuncture of the Oriental Europe, în the pages of this chapter being exposed the arguments that lead to this conclusion. The treaty, far from having settled the rapports between Russia and the Porte on mutual advantageous bases, aș the Russian diplomacy claimed, hâș an other major significance for the history of the internațional relations, în general, for the one concerning the Eastern Question, în particular. That is the fact that the Porte was
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the Porte on mutual advantageous bases, aș the Russian diplomacy claimed, hâș an other major significance for the history of the internațional relations, în general, for the one concerning the Eastern Question, în particular. That is the fact that the Porte was restrained by the circumstances to hope to adhere to the European political system, using for this a large coalition, but not against the danger that was the Russian oriental politics for the integrity of the Empire. On the contrary
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On the contrary, the final solution was the alliance with Russia, its century old enemy, and directed against a former ally, which, în thwart of a syncope, was until that moment the fundament of the European politics made by the Porte: France. But it hâd the same position after the conflict with France, generated by the Egyptian crisis, which ended, after the peace of Amiens was signed, on the 23rd of June 1802. The proclamation of Napoleon Bonaparte aș emperor of
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with France, generated by the Egyptian crisis, which ended, after the peace of Amiens was signed, on the 23rd of June 1802. The proclamation of Napoleon Bonaparte aș emperor of France, on the 18th of May 1804, whose title the Porte was în doubt if to admit or not, to avoid the retaliation from Russia and England was the future source of a new and serious deterioration of the French-Ottoman rapports. Under these circumstances, the Porte was again forced to find
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May 1804, whose title the Porte was în doubt if to admit or not, to avoid the retaliation from Russia and England was the future source of a new and serious deterioration of the French-Ottoman rapports. Under these circumstances, the Porte was again forced to find a route to Europe, which will assure its security, again through an alliance against France. The expression of this necessity was the Defensive alliance treaty, on the 11th /23rd of September 1805, made with Russia
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Iași (Iassy, Jassi), 5, 10-12, 17, 19, 23, 25, 29, 30-32, 39, 42, 43, 45, 46, 58, 154, 161, 168, 169, 197, 198, 201, 205, 212, 214, 221, 233, 238, 252, 258, 263, 280 Imperiul Otoman (Empire Otoman, Poartă Otomană, Porta Ottomana, Sublime Porte, Turcia, Turquie), passim India, 63, 250 Insulele Ioniene, 28, 48, 49, 53, 228, 232, 249 Iorga, Nicolae, 44, 47, 89, 223 Iosif al II-lea, 14, 52, 55, 56 Ipsilanti, Alexandru, 11, 12, 46 Ipsilanti, Constantin, 46, 223
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